The medals bestowed on the Indian Prime Minister also mark a decade in which India transformed its relationship with the Gulf from one driven largely by oil and the Indian diaspora into a much broader strategic partnership encompassing energy, trade, investment, security and people-to-people ties.
For years, the Gulf was simply the most logical place for India to buy energy. It was close, reliable and comparatively cheap to ship from. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman became critical suppliers of crude, LNG and LPG. The Strait of Hormuz, a strategically vital, narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea became the natural energy highway into India.
Then, on the night of February 28, this year, the US and Israel launched a massive airstrike on Iran. Iran retaliated, and closed the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 39 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and almost in the visual range of the Iranian Military.
New Delhi began closely monitoring crude, petrol, diesel, LNG and LPG stocks. India had been importing about 60 per cent of its LPG requirements from Gulf suppliers including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Refineries were pushed to maximise production. Alternative crude cargoes had to be secured. There was an urgent need to ensure that India had adequate stocks of crude, petrol, diesel and aviation fuel.
Ironically, that vulnerability had already been identified in the policy papers. A Parliamentary Standing Committee report in 2023 warned that India's dependence on Middle Eastern suppliers could expose the country to geopolitical disruptions and recommended diversification of crude and gas sources. The Hormuz crisis turned that warning into a live national-security issue.
There is, however, no simple answer to this efficient and cost effective over dependence. The Gulf will remain the most economical option geographically and their crude grades are compatible with Indian refineries. This makes Gulf energy economically difficult to replace.
Brazilian crude typically takes about 25 days or more to reach India's west coast, against roughly 4–6 days from Middle East loading terminals. West African cargoes, such as Nigerian crude, take around 18–24 days via the Cape of Good Hope. Longer voyages raise tanker freight and bunker fuel, and can increase insurance, though war-risk premiums depend more on the route than on distance alone. US LNG takes far longer than Qatari or Emirati gas- about 30 to 35 days via the Cape, against 3–6 days from the Gulf. Russian crude can be highly competitive on price, but it's complicated as well because of the long sail time, western sanctions, high insurance, payment arrangements and geopolitical pressure.
Less than a decade ago, Iran and Venezuela were important sources of Indian crude. In 2018, India imported roughly 12% of its crude from Iran while Venezuela supplied about or 6–7%. Together, the two countries provided approximately 830,000 bpd, close to one-fifth of India's crude imports.
In the wake of the Russia – Ukraine war in February 2022, Western sanctions pushed Europe to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. India, meanwhile, began buying substantially more discounted Russian crude. Russia's share of India's crude imports rose from only a few per cent before the war to roughly 40 per cent in 2023. But geopolitics eventually complicated that equation too. The US pressure over Russian oil purchases and the broader sanctions environment forced Indian refiners to broaden their sourcing.
India imports a significant share of the natural gas it consumes, and Qatar has traditionally been one of its most important suppliers. Before the war, Qatar supplied roughly 11.4 million tonnes of LNG to India annually—about 40% of its total LNG imports—making it the country's single most important gas supplier. When Hormuz was disrupted, Qatari supplies were affected and Indian buyers had to search for cargoes elsewhere. US, Omani, Nigerian and Angolan LNG became more important.
This was diversification under pressure rather than diversification by design. Oman was particularly valuable because its LNG does not have to pass through Hormuz. US and African supplies offered further alternatives, although their longer voyages made them more expensive.
One of India's strongest defences has been its refining system
India has one of the world's largest refining capacities, with sophisticated plants capable of processing a wide range of crude grades. Indian refiners can switch between Russian, Gulf, African and Latin American grades depending on price and availability. That matters because energy security is not simply about having access to different suppliers. It is also about being able to use what is available.
India accelerated diversification after the Hormuz disruption. Between March and August, it sourced crude from 31 countries, adding 10 new suppliers, including Venezuela, Iran, Ecuador, Algeria and Canada. LNG sourcing also shifted, between May and July, the US, Nigeria, Oman and Angola supplied about 78% of India's 7.08 MT LNG imports. In August the United States remained the largest supplier, at about roughly 35 per cent of arrivals, followed by Nigeria Qatar sent no cargoes.
There is nevertheless a cost to this knee-jerk diversification strategy
A barrel from Venezuela, West Africa or Latin America may require a longer voyage than one from the Gulf. Alternative LNG cargoes may involve higher freight and insurance costs. Different crude grades may require blending or adjustments at refineries.
In a global crisis, those costs increase because India has to compete for the same cargoes with Europe, China, Japan and South Korea. For a country of India's size, even a small increase in the landed price of crude can feed into transport costs, inflation and household expenses.
The Crisis in the Gulf may have given a much-needed wake up call to the policymakers and oil importing companies in India, but the Gulf is far more than an energy supplier for Indians. Millions of Indians live and work there. Trade, investment, remittances, food security, maritime cooperation and defence ties have made the region a critical strategic partner.
What India must do is to de-hyphenate its Gulf partnership from its energy vulnerability. That means continuing to buy Gulf crude and LNG because they are competitive while simultaneously strengthening long term alternate sourcing from Russia, the United States, Australia, Africa and Latin America.
It also requires an increase in domestic production, larger strategic petroleum reserves which should not only last a few weeks but months, LNG storage, and a push in the mix of renewable energy, nuclear power, biofuels and electric mobility.
The Lesson From Hormuz
Few weeks into the crisis, the Indian government said the share of crude arriving from outside Hormuz had risen to around 70 per cent from roughly 55 per cent earlier. That flexibility helped prevent a domestic supply crisis. But it should not be mistaken for the end of the vulnerability.
The Hormuz crisis does not seem to be ending anytime soon. Even if the war ends, the waterway will remain free for navigation like it used to be, no one believes that. This would test India's ability to secure crude, LNG and LPG while competing with major Asian and European consumers with alternative suppliers.
The past decade has shown India the value of strategic partnerships. The Hormuz crisis has shown the value of strategic choices. For years, geography gave India cheap and reliable energy. In 2026, the same geography became a source of strategic anxiety. India's long-term energy policy will have to reconcile those two realities.